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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1949-1950*
I.

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

F OR SEVERAL YEARS this annual survey of Illinois law has
opened on a note to the effect that one of these days it would
be possible to record that the Illinois Supreme Court had reexamined the doctrine which grants an immunity to an eleemosynary or charitable corporation against tort liability for the acts
of its agents and had either reinforced or rejected the doctrine;
thereby laying to rest the conflict which has, over the years, developed between two of the Appellate Courts of the state' and
2
even between divisions of the court sitting in the same district.
There was occasion to believe, when the Supreme Court took jurisdiction over the case of Moore v. Moyle 3 on certificate of impor* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,

but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention to cases and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 403 Ill. 395 to 406 Ill. 253; from 338 Ill. App. 20 to
341 Ill. App. 382.
1 Compare the decision of the Appellate Court for the First District in Wendt v.

Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), with that of the
Second District in Moore v. Moyle, 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d) 61 (1948).
2 The views of the First Division of the Appellate Court for the First District

were presented in the decision in Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139
(1945). Those of the Second Division of the same court were expressed In Wendt
v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947).
3 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 268,
38 Ill. B. J. 581. Wilson, J., dissented. Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
The holding therein reversed the decision in 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d) 61
(1948).
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tance, that the day for decision had arrived. Early reports that
the court was inclined to favor reinforcement of the doctrine,'
first laid down in Parks v. Northvwestern University,5 were upset
when the opinion was finally released.6 But proponents for the
view that the entire doctrine of immunity should be swept aside
also suffered a disappointment in the ultimate outcome of the case,
for the majority of the court limited recovery, against the eleemosynary corporation there concerned, to the "non-trust" assets.
While the decision does not nullify the immunity doctrine, it does
serve to restrict its prior sweep and now leads to the belief that
insurance carriers for charitable corporations have not been
handling a "sure "thing. It is a matter for conjecture, however,
as to whether the court was displaying a perception for contemporary events 7 as well as for predominantly adverse criticisms
which have been addressed to certain of the recent decisionss or
whether the decision is truly, as the majority opinion would indicate, merely a clarification of an already established position. If
the latter, there will be need for further clarification insofar as it
will be necessary to spell out those things which constitute "nontrust" assets. Whatever the truth of the matter, the rationale
of the holding in the Moore case leaves much to be desired from
the standpoint of satisfactory juristic logic, desirable as it may be
to some in terms of the result attained. It must again be reiterated,
therefore, that it is to be hoped that the not too distant future
will bring about a complete abrogation of this phase of tort
immunity."
An interesting opinion in the case of Sawers v. American
4 See 38 Ill. B. J. 68, noting action in case No. 30957. Publication of the opinion
was withheld pending application for a rehearing.
5 218 111. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 556 (1905).
6405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), reversing 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d)
61 (1948).
7 Consider, for example, the recent Effingham Hospital fire.

8 See CHiaoAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw, Vol. 21, p. 256; Vol. 24, p. 266; Vol. 26, p. 279;
Vol. 28, p. 1. In addition, see 36 Ill. B. J. 488; 43 Ill. L. Rev. 248, 16 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 173.
9 Crampton, J., in his dissenting opinion to Moore v. Moyle, stated: "...
the
crucial policy of exempting charitable institutions from tort liability is of sufficient
gravity to require a further appraisal by this court of the reasons which sustain
it." 405 Ill. 555 at 568, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 at 8w. Others will be inclined to echo his
views.
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Phenolic Corporation'° provides further discussion of the oftlitigated problem concerning the limitations which a corporation,
through its agents, may impose on the right of a shareholder to
inspect and make extracts from the books and records of the business." The lower court had issued a writ of mandamus to force
the corporate defendant to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to
make a list of the shareholders. It had also imposed a statutory
penalty on the individual defendants calculated according to the2
formula laid down in Section 45 of the Business Corporation Act.'
On appeal therefrom, the individual defendants asserted that the
statute was unconstitutional insofar as it provided for the imposition of the penalty because the statutory language was too vague
and indefinite to inform a reasonable person concerning the nature
of the act upon which he could be exposed to liability. The allegation arose from the fact that, in permitting the agent to deny
access to a shareholder who did not evince a "proper purpose"
for his desire to examine the books, the statute had failed to spell
out any test for the determination of either a "proper" or an
"improper" purpose. By way of answer, the court pointed out
that the section had been construed, in Doggett v. North American
Life Insurance Company,13 to be no more than a codification of the
common law and that numerous prior cases had defined "proper
purpose" in respect to the problem at hand, hence the statutory
term had achieved sufficient definitiveness to meet constitutional
4
requirements.1
The holding in Stiles v. Aluminum Products Company'5 pro10404 Iii. 440, 89 N. E. (2d) 374 (1950), noted in 38 Ii. B. J. 334. Crampton, J.,
dissented.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
12 The section provides, in part, that any officer or agent who shall "refuse to
allow any such shareholder . . . to examine and make extracts . . . for any proper
purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder ... in a penalty of ten per cent of the
value of the shares owned by such shareholder."
13396 Ill. 354, 71 N. E. (2d) 686 (1947).
14 Much of the language of the decision may well be classed as dicta for the trial
court decision was reversed because the court found that plaintiff had not shown
that his demand for inspection was based on a proper purpose. But it is apparent,
at first reading, that the same view would have been followed, on the specific point,
if the case had conme up on appeal from a judgment favoring a shareholder who had
displayed proper purpose in support of his request.
15338 Ill. App. 48, 86 N. E. (2d) 887, 9 A. L. R. (2d) 1311 (1949).
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vides an object lesson in perspective. The defendant corporation
there involved had sought to sell certain of its assets, and the issue
was whether the sale was one outside of the ordinary course of
business. The corporation had been formed many years before
to manufacture cooking utensils but had later obtained an amendment to its articles allowing it to deal in securities. Thereafter,
it set up a subsidiary corporation to manage a housing development for its employees. It then announced its purpose to sell all
of the assets which had been used in connection with its manufacturing activities. Plaintiff, having taken all necessary steps
required by Section 73 of the Business Corporation Act for the
protection of dissenting minority shareholders, 16 sought to force
the corporation to buy up his shares. To that action, the corporation interposed the defense that it was not going out of business
was only selling a few of its assets, and that the sale did not
amount to one "otherwise than in the usual and regular course of
its business." The lower court dismissed the shareholder's suit
but the Appellate Court, pointing to the fact that the corporation
was planning to sell assets worth over one million dollars, 17 while
keeping other assets valued at less than a million,' came to the
conclusion that the practical effect of the sale would be to turn
the defendant into nothing more than a holding company. It justifiably pointed out that to hold that the proposed plan was not
a sale of assets of the type contemplated by the terms of Section
73 would be to do violence to the rights of the dissenting shareholder. It is difficult to comprehend how any other decision could
have been reached.
Reminder is offered, by the case of Firebaughv. McGovern,19
that while most corporation law rests upon a statutory foundation
other areas of this field are regulated by the common law. The
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.73.
17 The assets which were offered for sale included the plants, inventories, machines, patents, etc. Sale thereof would, for all practical purposes, bring about an
end to corporate ability to manufacture those products authorized by the original
articles.
18 Assets to be retained included cash in bank, choses in action, capital stock in
the subsidiary, and a used automobile.
19404 Ill. 143, 88 N. E. (2d) 473 (1949), reversing 336 Ill. App. 61, 82 N. E. (2d)
832 (1948). An order conforming to the opinion therein may be noted in 340 Ill.
App. 414, 92 N. E. (2d) 671 (1950).
16
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facts therein would indicate that the litigation developed because
warring factions on a board of directors, unable to agree regarding management policy, sought a court determination as to the
right of exclusive control over the corporation's affairs. When it
appeared that the corporate depositary refused to honor checks
issued by either group of directors, thereby exposing the business
to the potentiality of irreparable loss barring a quick resolution
of differences, the trial court, on its own motion, appointed a
receiver to preserve the assets and to operate the business. Following a resolution of the differences between the two factions, the
receiver turned back the corporate assets and filed his account.
Objection was made to the deduction of receivership expenses on
20
the ground of a lack of jurisdiction to make the appointment.
The Appellate Court sustained the objection but, on leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming decisions antedating
the present Business Corporation Act which hold that, under proper
circumstances, an equity court may exercise its extraordinary
power to appoint a receiver, even in corporation cases, independently of any statutory authorization, whenever the facts require it.21
The basis for the survival of a remedy against a dissolved
corporation has been litigated before, so the decision in O'Neill
v. Continental Illinois Company22 is not particularly surprising,
but the case does afford an excellent illustration of the need for
providing some form of limitation on the survival of such causes
of action. The plaintiff charged that, in 1929, the defendant corporation had acted as agent for her late husband in the purchase
of a large block of government bonds for his account, the same
to mature in 1930. The corporation, in 1939, was dissolved pursuant to Illinois law. Eight years later the plaintiff made a demand on the directors of the defunct corporation for delivery of
the bonds and followed that demand with a suit initiated in 1948,
20 Statutory authority for the appointment of a receiver in case of deadlock, to
be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.86, is limited to cases wherein
dissolution of the corporation is sought.
21 See, for example, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mack, 347 Ill. 480, 180 N. E. 412
(1912) ; Baker v. Administrator of Backus, 32 Ill. 79 (1863).
22 341 Il1.

App. 119, 93 N. E.

(2d)

160 (1950).

Appeal dismissed.
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nineteen years after the alleged purchase was supposed to have
occurred. Reliance by way of defense was placed on Section 94
of the Business Corporation Act and the two-year limitation fixed
thereby. 23 In view of the fact that no charge of fraud was made
and no claim was asserted that the defendant corporation had
not been properly dissolved, the court considered the defense to
be good.
PRINCIPAL AND AGFBNT.

An employee, driving his employer's car, may deviate from
the route he is supposed or expected to travel, but whether he
thereby steps outside the scope of his employment or not is usually
answered on the basis of the extent and nature of the deviation.
The case of Anderson v. Meyer 24 becomes significant in that connection. The employee there concerned, driving a truck for his
employer and having made the final delivery for the day, drove
the empty truck toward the employer's garage. On the way, he
suddenly decided to deviate from the route in order to pick up his
personal mail. While making a left turn, made necessary by the
deviation, he collided with another truck. Upon that set of facts,
the Appellate Court held the employee could not be deemed to be
acting within the course of his employment at the time of the collision, hence exempted the employer from liability. The decision
would appear to be at least a doubtful one, for no attention was
given by the court to the circumstance as to whether or not the
intended deviation was slight in character or amounted to a complete departure from the employment course. A determination on
that point would seem to be a matter of importance, for it has been
held many times that slight deviations by employees should be
expected by employers, with the consequent effect that such employees must still be considered to have acted within the scope
of the employment.
It became necessary, in City of Chicago v. Barnett,25 for the
Supreme Court to consider whether there is a distinction between
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.94.
24 338 Ill. App. 414, 87 N. E. (2d) 787 (1949).
25404 Il. 136, 88 N. E. (2d) 477 (1949).

Leave to appeal has been denied.
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a "broker," on the one hand, and an "agent," on the other. The
question developed from a challenge to the validity of a Chicago
ordinance designed to regulate brokers, particularly insurance
brokers. 26 An insurance broker was defined, in the ordinance,
as "any person who for money, commission, brokerage, or anything of value acts or aids in any manner in the solicitation or
negotiation on behalf of the assured of contracts of insurance."
The defendant admitted that the Cities and Villages Act furnished
power to municipalities to license, tax and regulate brokers in
general,2 7 but claimed that an "insurance broker," as defined in
the ordinance, was not a person within the generic term used in
the statute. The contention was based, in particular, upon the
argument that the occupation described in the ordinance was an
agency relationship, one beyond municipal power to license.
The Supreme Court, however, did not agree. It pointed to
the fact that the word "broker," unless used with other words of
restriction or limitation, includes within its scope brokers of every
class and description. It noted that, in general, a broker is an
agent who bargains or carries on negotiations on behalf of the
principal, acting as an intermediary between the principal and
third persons in the transaction of business relating to the acquisition of contractual rights, or the sale or purchase of any form of
property, the custody of which has not been entrusted to him for
the purpose of discharging his agency. For some purposes, the
broker may be treated as agent for both parties, but he is primarily deemed the agent of the person by whom he is originally
employed. The word "agent," or course, is a more comprehensive
term than "broker," for while every broker is, in a sense, an
agent, every agent is not a broker. Unlike the agent, the broker
sustains no fixed and permanent relationship to any principal,
but holds himself open for employment by the public generally,
the employment in each instance being that of a special agent for
a single object. Keeping these principles in mind, it then becomes
obvious that the city ordinance in question was a valid one.
An issue frequently litigated concerns the ownership of in26 Mun. Code Chicago, Ch. 113, § 10.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23-91.
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ventions or discoveries made by an employee while working for
his employer. In Velsicol Corporation v. Hyman,2' a chemist
had been employed to work in development and research concerning polymers, discoveries having to do with drying oils used in
the manufacture of paint and varnish. Although originally employed at a small salary, he became director of the entire research program of the firm and a large stockholder in the company.
During the course of his connection with the company, he assigned
some thirty-nine patents to it in order to increase his stock holdings. He refused, however, to assign four patent applications
having to do with discoveries as to insecticides. The company
sued to compel specific performance and the Appellate Court, by
a split decision, directed dismissal of the suit. The majority of
the judges of that court agreed that if an employee is specially
employed to discover and develop a specific invention, using the
facilities and materials of his employer, so that the invention is
ultimately perfected at the employer's expense, the invention or
discovery becomes, in equity and good conscience, the property
of the employer. There is said to be, in such a case, at least an
implied contract on the part of the employee to assign the patent
to the employer. Dismissal was ordered, however, on the basis
that the defendant had been hired to work in the field of polymers
and his subsequent discoveries as to insecticides bore no relation
to that subject.
For support, the majority pointed to the decision in Joliet
Manufacturing Company v. Dice,29 where the Supreme Court had
said "the law inclines so strongly to the rule that the invention
shall be the property of its inventor, that nothing short of a clear
and specific contract to that effect will vest the property of the
invention in the employer, to the exclusion of the inventor.'30 It
was willing to recognize the applicability of the so-called "shop
rights" doctrine under which an employer acquires an irrevocable
28405 Ill. 352, 90 N. E. (2d) 717 (1950), cert. den. 339 U. S. 966, 70 S. Ct. 1002,
94 L. Ed. 914 (1950), reversing 338 Il. App. 52, 87 N. E. (2d) 35 (1949). Niemeyer,
J., wrote a dissenting opinion. The Appellate Court decision is noted in 25 Notre
Dame Law. 158 and 28 Tex. L. Rev. 728.
29 105 Ill. 649 (1883).
30 105 Il1. 649 at 651-2.
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license to use an invention of an employee, if developed by the
use of the employer's property, labor, and time, without the payment of any royalty. But, judging the case from the angle of
strict property rights, it was unwilling to divest the employee
of the fruits of his brain and labor. The dissenting judge, in
contrast, viewed the case from the aspect of the fiduciary relation
which exists between employer and employee. He came to the
conclusion that protection of that relationship, recognized by
earlier assignments of other patents, required enforcement of
fiduciary obligations in respect to subsequent inventions made
during the course of the employment, regardless of the nature
thereof.
When the case reached the Supreme Court on leave to appeal,
that court reversed and ordered specific performance on the
ground the evidence disclosed the existence of an express agreement to assign all patents based on discoveries made during the
period of employment, without limitation. With that fact established, the case tends to lack interest, but the opinion of the Appellate Court is much more interesting than that of the Supreme
Court and worthy of closer study for its discussion of the law
on the point in the absence of an express agreement between employer and employee.A
An interesting and novel problem for Illinois, one involving
the relationship of the Statute of Frauds to the purchase of real
estate by a fiduciary, was brought to the Supreme Court through
the medium of the case of Black v. Gray.A2 The question presented
was whether an agent, employed by a principal under an oral
agreement to purchase a parcel of land, but who later purchased
the same with his own funds and in his own name, could be deemed
to be a constructive trustee when he refused to convey to the
principal. The court answered the question in the affirmative.
It noted the existence of authority for the view that an agent
who has accepted a verbal employment to negotiate for the purchase of land on behalf of another, but who purchases for himself
31 See also Knoth, "Assignment of Future Inventions," 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 295-307 (1949).
32403 Ill. 503, 87 N. E. (2d) 635 (1949).
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with his own funds, cannot be compelled to convey the land to the
principal because of the failure to comply with the Statute of
Frauds. The Illinois court, however, believed such reasoning
was contrary to fundamental principles of equity for the essence
of the agent's obligation was to act on behalf of the principal.
It was the breach of that primary duty which gave rise to the
constructive trust rather than the failure to convey the title
acquired. For that reason, it said the fact that the subject matter
of the agency was land was not enough to "alter the legal effect
33
of a violation of his fiduciary duty.' '
LABOR LAW

The bulk of the new issues in the field of labor law grew out of
claims for unemployment compensation. Eligibility therefor is
lacking if the employee is out of work "because of a labor dispute
at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or
was last employed," 34 and the lack of eligibility continues as long
as the labor dispute lasts. It became necessary in American Steel
Foundries v. Gordon,3 5 to determine whether an employee is entitled to the benefits of unemployment compensation after the
strike has been terminated but while he is unemployed because
of time lost in preparing the plant for the resumption of work.
The workers there involved contended that a labor dispute and a
stoppage of work must co-exist before benefits are to be denied
and that, after settlement of a labor dispute, one of the prerequisites to ineligibility would be missing. The agencies entrusted with the administration of the unemployment compensation act as well as the circuit court agreed, but the Supreme Court
did not. It declared that, while the stoppage of work, for ineligibility, must exist because of a labor dispute, the statute does
not require that the labor dispute should continue to exist or be
in active progress. It was enough that the stoppage arose because
of a labor dispute.
33403 Ill. 503 at 506, 87 N. E. (2d) 635 at 636.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 223.
35404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E.

(2d) 465 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

172, 1950 Ill. L. Forum 155.
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Another aspect of Section 7(d) of the statute came to the
fore in three recent cases. In particular, the problem was one
of determining whether the applicants for compensation were
''participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor
dispute which caused the stoppage of work," or belonged to a
grade or class of workers who were so participating or financing
the dispute. In two of those cases, being the cases of Local No.
658, Boot and Shoe Workers Union v. Brown Shoe Company 6
and of Brown Shoe Company v. Gordon,8 7 the specific issue was
whether production workers who became idle because of a work
stoppage produced by other workers on the production line were
entitled to compensation. Only a few key workers expressed dissatisfaction with certain changes which had been made by the
company in its production plans, but all production and maintenance employees, including those expressing dissatisfaction,
were represented by the same union as collective bargaining
agent and only one contract existed between the company and
the union. As all were concerned in one continuous production
line, the court held all production workers belonged to the same
grade, hence were directly interested in the dispute. It might
be noted that the union had represented all production workers
in prior negotiations affecting rates of pay and the particular
stoppage of work was traceable to the initial controversy.
Payment of compensation was, however, ordered in Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Company v. Gordon,3 where the
claimants were office workers in a plant and had been made idle
because of a strike on the part of the production workers. The
office workers were represented by a different union than the
one acting for the production workers, although an affiliation
existed between the two. The office employees did not share in
the labor dispute, did not seek or expect any benefit from the
strike, and made no direct financial contribution to its support.
Furthermore, as office workers, they were clearly in a different
386403 Ill.
37405 Ill.
38403 Ill.
156, 45 Ii.

484, 87
384, 91
523, 87
L. Rev.

N. E. (2d) 625 (1949).
N. E. (2d) 381 (1950).
N. E. (2d) 610 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
128.
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grade or class from the strikers. An argument that failure on
the part of the office employees to cross a picket line set up by
the striking production workers should be considered as evidence
of participation in the work stoppage collapsed in the face of
evidence that the gates of the plant were locked to all except a
few maintenance employees.
Refusal to cross a picket line, however, did affect eligibility
to receive unemployment compensation in the case of American
Brake Shoe Company v. Annunzio. 39 The employer there concerned operated a number of establishments in the Chicago industrial area. A labor dispute having arisen in one of the plants,
the workers there employed, represented by one union, walked
out and dispatched pickets to another plant of the same employer
where the workers belonged to another union. The latter became
unemployed when they failed to cross the picket line so established. The Supreme Court affirmed denial of compensation to
the second group of employees because the testimony of a union
steward disclosed that the real reason for the failure to cross
The
the picket line was the desire not to be branded a "scab."
gate,
plant
the
at
stationed
were
officers
police
that
record showed
that employees were informed during the course of the picketing that all who cared to cross the picket line might do so, and
that no overt act was committed by the employer by which to
preclude its employees from entering the premises. The refusal
to cross being deemed voluntary, the second group of employees
were considered as having participated in the labor dispute.
The only other labor case of significance, that of American
Zinc Company of Illinois v. Vecera,40 gave the Appellate Court
an opportunity to reiterate its position that a union may be subjected to contempt proceedings, and is not excused from liability for its acts, even though it is nothing more than a voluntary unincorporated association. The court there adverted, with
approval, to the rather doubtful view which had, inferentially,
been expressed by the United States Supreme Court in the Mead39 405 1. 44, 90 N. E. (2d) 83 (1950).
40 338 IU. App. 523, 88 N. E. (2d) 116 (1949).
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owmoor case, 4 1 to the effect that a union might be held responsible for the acts of its officers and its agents despite the fact
such acts might not be attributable to it under a strict application of rules concerning respondeat superior.
WORKMEN 'S

COMPENSATION

Instances exist under which the common-law right to bring
an action for personal injuries is denied to those benefited by the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The denial of
such right of action, however, will often depend upon adequate
pleading and proof. In Victor v. Dehmlow, 42 for example, the
defendants alleged, by way of defense to a suit for wrongful death,
that the plaintiff's intestate was in the course of his employer's
business at the time he was killed by a car driven by defendant's
employee. If that were true, plaintiff could not maintain a common-law action. 4 3 An argument developed over whether the burden of proof rested on the defendants to show that both they and
the plaintiff's intestate came under the statutory provision. To
do this, the defendant would have been obliged to prove (a)
that plaintiff's intestate, at the time he was killed, was in the
course of his employment and that the accident arose therefrom,
and (b) that the employer and the driver who caused the accident were also within the statute. The Supreme Court resolved
the argument against the defendant.
The claimant in Harrison Sheet Steel Company v. Industrial
Commission"4 suffered an accidental injury to his elbow, having
previously sustained an injury to the same elbow two years
before. The claimant had filed an application for adjustment
of claim concerning the prior injury, had received an award from
an arbitrator, but had entered into a settlement agreement with
the employer while a petition for review was pending before the
Industrial Commission. The settlement agreement received the ap41 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 61 S.
Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A. L. R. 1200 (1941).
42405 Ill. 249, 90 N. E. (2d) 724 (1950).
Action taken by the Appellate Court,
336 I1. App. 432, 84 N. E. (2d) 342 (1949), was noted in 27 CmcAGo-KENT LAW
REviEw 257.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§ 139 and 166.
44 404 I1. 557, 90 N. E. (2d) 220 (1950).
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proval of the Commission and the proceeding was dismissed.
When making an award for the later injury, the Industrial Commission took into consideration the amount of compensation which
the claimant had received under the settlement for the prior injury. This action was objected to by the employee who claimed
that the law authorizes such a procedure only where a prior injury has led to a final award. 45 According to the employee, there
had been no final award for the previous injury. The Supreme
Court, however, upheld the action of the Commission, stating that
a settlement agreement which has received the approval of the
Commission is, in legal effect, a final award and constitutes a
proper method for computing the deduction to be taken, based on
a prior injury, when making a subsequent award for a later
injury to the same member of a claimant's body.
The question arose, in Olney Seed Company v. Industrial
Commission,46 as to whether a claimant is entitled to compensation for an injury received if the employer, with knowledge of the
accidental injury, has paid the regular and full wages of the
claimant during the period of incapacity and has not denied liability under the act. The question was answered in the negative
by the Supreme Court when it reversed both the holding of the
Industrial Commission and the circuit court. The high court
pointed out that prior cases had held that the payment of wages
by an employer who did not deny liability for the employee's
accidental injury could be considered for the purpose of fixing
the time within which an employee must file his claim. Simple
justice and consistency demanded that the same principle should
apply for the purpose of arriving at a total or partial discharge
of the employer's monetary liability.
PARTNERSHIPS

If it were not for the fact that the Appellate Court for the
First District included an interesting bit of dicta at the conclusion of its opinion in Kurtzon v. Kurtzon,4 7 the field of partner45 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 145(e).
46 403 I1. 587, 88 N. E. (2d) 24 (1949), noted in 28 CmIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
178.
47339 Il. App. 431, 90 N. E. (2d) 245 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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ship law would have been completely barren of any significant
developments. The plaintiff and defendants in that particular
case were partners. The former, wishing to withdraw and dissolve the association, instituted proper proceedings and requested
the appointment of a receiver. By way of defense, it was alleged
that the partnership had been created for a term of ten years;
that the plaintiff had no right to withdraw and dissolve; that
his action in so doing constituted a breach of the partnership
contract; and that the defendants were, accordingly, entitled to a
decree of dissolution together with an assessment of damages.
The trial court, finding that the plaintiff had not alleged or proven
any of the causes for dissolution recognized by the Uniform Partnership Act in instances where such relationships have been entered into for a definite period, 48 allowed the relief requested by
the defendants. Upon appeal, the decree was affirmed.
Up to the last two paragraphs of the opinion, the court's
reasoning is in conformity with well-recognized rules of partnership law. However, in arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiff possessed no right to withdraw and dissolve the association,
the court stated: "The agreement gave no unqualified right to
withdraw and dissolve the firm. It could not do so. The Partnership Act enumerates the causes of rightful dissolution where the
agreement is for a definite term . . . No provision is made for
dissolution by withdrawal." ' 40 According to this dicta, it would
be impossible for a group contemplating the formation of a partnership for a definite period to provide in the agreement that one
of their number might withdraw and dissolve whenever he desired. The inclusion of such a condition may be the only practical way to obtain the association of an individual having a
desirable credit rating but who would only consider entering the
venture if he was assured of an unqualified right to dissolve the
firm.. In such a situation, an interpretation of the Partnership
Act such as that adhered to by the court might conceivably frustrate the creation of a profitable enterprise. It could, of course,
48
49

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 106%, § 31.
339 Il1. App. 431 at 436, 90 N. E. (2d) 245 at 248.
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be argued that, by eliminating the definite time period, the partnership would become one at will and, as this type could be dissolved by any member at any time, the obstacle presented by the
foregoing construction of the statute could be overcome. This,
however, overlooks situations wherein it might be advantageous
to bind the majority of the group for the definite period.
The mere fact that a group of individuals may have acquired
funds due to their combination does not conclusively prove the
existence of a joint venture. This is amply illustrated by the
decision in Sappenfield v. Mead,50 a case involving a rather novel
factual situation. The Board of Supervisors of Kane County had
raised the ire of certain property owners by rezoning their residential district to allow the entrance of manufacturing enterprises. The property owners combined and proceeded to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the order. In the
meantime, a manufacturing concern which had commenced the
building of a plant in the area learned of the petition and offered
the group a substantial sum to withdraw their objections. The
parties agreed, and a settlement was made. The defendant, a
member of the owner's group, who had acted as their representative, collected the money, liquidated the expenses, and distributed
the remainder on the basis of the damage suffered by the various property owners. Upon receipt of his allotment, plaintiff instituted a suit for an accounting, claiming that the funds should
have been divided equally among the several members.
Meetings of the group had led to considerable discussion
over the mode of distribution but apparently no particular scheme
had been definitely arrived at, although a majority favored distribution on the basis of damage suffered. The plaintiff argued,
in the trial court, that in the absence of a specific agreement
all parties were entitled to an equal share for the association
amounted to a joint venture. The lower court dismissed the
complaint and the Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed, finding that a joint venture did not exist. That court,
utilizing the standard definition of such a relationship, to-wit:
50 338 Ill. App. 236, 87 N. E. (2d) 220 (1949).
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"an association of two or more persons to carry out a single
business enterprise for profit," demonstrated that the profit motive was lacking in the particular case. As the association was
not a joint venture, the law pertaining to such would not apply.
The court did not discuss the propriety of dividing the sum according to the degree of damage suffered but apparently accepted that plan as being the only equitable method for distribution.
While appropriate for discussion as much elsewhere as here,
point might be made of the fact that it is not uncommon for
partnerships, associations, and individual proprietors to do business under an assumed or trade name. The conduct of business
in that form in Illinois may produce unfortunate repercussions,
a fact which was noted last year in connection with the decision in
Michelson v. Kolb'
The views expressed in that case were followed in the later case of Franks v. Coronet Novelty Co., Inc.52
The Appellate Court there reversed a judgment which had been
granted in favor of an individual proprietor who had done business under an assumed name but who had failed to register the
fact in the fashion required by law.5 3 The case is worthy of mention for the trial court had refused to apply the statute on
the ground the same was unconstitutional. 54 There is occasion
to believe that the harsh results being produced are not in conformity with either the intention of the legislature or the tenor
of decisions in other jurisdictions, hence some clarification on
the point is expected from the Supreme Court at an early date. 55
51337 Il. App. 493, 86 N. E. (2d) 152 (1949), noted in CIICAG-KEIT LAW
REviEw, Vol. 27, pp. 327-36, and Vol. 28, p. 11.
52341 Ill. App. 137, 93 N. E.

(2d)

157 (1950).

53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq. The statute contains certain
exceptions in favor of corporations and trusts, as well as one for partnerships
where the partnership name includes the "true, real name of such person or persons transacting said business." Ibid., § 7.
54 The Appellate Court refused to pass on the constitutional question on the
ground the same was not properly before it: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 199.
55 A note appears, in 39 Iil. B. .1. 230, outside the period of this survey, of the
action purported to have been taken by the Supreme Court at the November, 1950,
term in the case of Grody v. Scalone, No. 31631. The note would indicate that the
court held the legislative intent was not to make an otherwise valid contract into
an invalid one for failure to comply with the Assumed Name Statute. The opinion
in that case has not yet been released for publication.

